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1. Introduction
　In this lecture, I would like to talk about negotiations toward a 
nuclear weapons convention （hereinafter referred to as “NWC”）, 
which is expected to be held in 2017 at the headquarters of the 
United Nations in New York, in terms of the themes of human 
security and efforts toward nuclear abolition, while bearing in mind 
the future conclusion of such a treaty. Among the Panelists who 
make presentations  today, I am the only one who has practitioners’ 
background as a former Foreign Service officer, I would like to touch 
upon the analysis on Japan’s position and the current circumstances 
surrounding the current discussion on nuclear disarmament. Sooner 
or later, these negotiations will be concluded and a treaty will be 
then opened for signature, I have a strong sense that it would be 
problematic if Japan, as the only nation to have suffered from atomic 
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bombing, were not able to obtain approval from the Diet to ratify the 
treaty which will be useful for total elimination of nuclear weapons. 
For this reason, even though this may be  a little technical, after 
first of all reviewing Japan’s position statement by presenting some 
cases relating to disarmament treaties to date, I would like to begin 
with some procedural matters that serve as the prerequisite for such 
negotiations and then substantial matters such as basic obligations 
and national application clause which demand for municipal law 
enactment in view of  the conclusion of such a treaty, referring to the 
similar precedent cases in the field of disarmament treaty that may 
be supposed to be the principal issue of these matters.
　Since today’s symposium is aimed at the general public, I first 
lay out some fundamentals of international law making for NWC 
negotiations. Because disarmament measures seek to reduce 
weapons and the military, which fall within the realm of states’ 
sovereignty, disarmament measures are sometimes undertaken 
voluntarily or unilaterally. Thus, these are always subject to security 
considerations and as we have seen, are largely undertaken in forms 
of a legally binding treaty which obliges States Parties to comply 
with them. Taking the case of negotiations of the Arms Trade Treaty 
（ATT） as the most recent example of a disarmament treaty, we can 
see that disarmament negotiations are not exceptional even where 
they are intended to regulate the transfer of ordinary weapons that 
are not considered to be high-priority when compared with nuclear 
weapons. Incidentally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
（hereinafter referred to as “VCLT”） defines a treaty in this sense 
to mean “an international agreement concluded between States in 
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied 
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
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whatever its particular designation.”
　To begin with, the VCLT, which we could regard as the “basic law 
of treaties”, is important in terms of fundamental rules related to 
the treaty being discussed here. Accordingly, many of these rules 
that have become customary for treaties are codified by this VCLT. 
For example, even though the U.S. is not a signatory to the VCLT, 
it has complied with its state practice even under the provisional 
application rules of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). 
To cite another example, the VCTL defines a “negotiating State” to 
mean “a State which took part in the drawing up and adoption of the 
text of the treaty” （Article 2.1［e］）. It also sets out various provisions 
for specific procedures for formal participation in treaty negotiations, 
including that delegates should have full powers to represent 
the state in question. Treaty negotiations are held according to 
these rules. For some of you, this will be akin to “preaching to the 
Buddha”; however, just in case, I touch lightly on the procedures 
for adopting a treaty and endowing the legally- binding power. The 
adoption of the text of a treaty, reflecting the fact that it is difficult in 
practice for all participating states  to agree in case  of multilateral 
negotiations, as is provided for in Article 9.2 of the VCLT, which 
stipulates that “the adoption of the text of a treaty at an international 
conference takes place by the vote of two thirds of the States present 
and voting, unless by the same majority they shall decide to apply a 
different rule.” Moreover, the way that the treaty is to be established 
as authentic and definitive is set out in Article 10 （a） as being 
“by such procedure as may be provided for in the text or agreed 
upon by the States participating in its drawing up” or “Failing such 
procedure, by the signature, signature ad referendum or initialing by 
the representatives of those States of the text of the treaty or of the 
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Final Act of a conference incorporating the text.” While you would 
notice that being a “State participating in the drawing up of the text 
treaty” occupies an important position in the treaty negotiations, the 
significance of at least participating in treaty negotiations is also evident.
　Furthermore, once treaty negotiations are concluded, an expression 
of consent to be bound by a treaty  will be given （that is, signature 
ad referendum, signature― in some cases this is all that is necessary
― followed by ratification, acceptance, and approval）. Since there 
are quite a few cases of the adoption of multilateral treaties by voting 
instead of consensus agreement, countries that regard the final form 
of the adopted treaty to be unacceptable, where not prohibited by the 
treaty itself, enter it with reservations.
　Even where reservations are prohibited, it is still possible for a 
country to begin the process of consent to the treaty in question after 
making adjustments according to its interests with an “interpretive 
declaration” rather than a “reservation.” However, you may be 
familiar with the problem of how the abuse of substantial reservations 
in the area of human rights in some  countries tend to dilute the 
effects of treaties. Conversely, states that do not agree to the treaty 
chose  to remain as non-contracting parties.
　I have explained the basic rules set out in the VCLT as a potential 
minimum standard for thinking regarding negotiating an NWC. 
However, since these points are indispensable for considering the 
future form of an NWC, I would like to return to them later in my 
lecture. 
2. Japan’s Position on a Nuclear Weapons Convention
　From here, I would like to examine Japan’s official position 
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as announced in relation to an NWC. Not only from remarks by 
Japanese representatives at international conferences but also in 
official statements made in the national Diet, such as those in official 
government replies and written answers to official questions enable 
us to know positions taken by the Government of Japan. Written 
answers to official questions, in particular, are decided upon by the 
Cabinet as formal answers to those who exercise the right to question 
the Cabinet as set out in Article 74 of the Diet Act. Accordingly, these 
are formulated under strict procedures after prior consideration 
by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and thus are positioned as the 
government’s official replies to the Diet― the executive branch 
under the tripartite separation of powers set out by the Constitution. 
Conversely, since oral responses in the Diet are delivered by the 
executive political officers of the competent government agency, 
these are accorded some latitude of discretion in that there are some 
lawmakers who do not answer in accordance with the prepared 
answer as much as they can in improvised ones. 
　Since the resolution on NWC negotiations was adopted by of 
the UN General Assembly, several relevant official questions have 
already been raised by members of the House of Representatives. 
Taking these in combination with previous questions related to the 
use （or prohibition） of nuclear weapons, we may observe that staking 
Japan’s position vis-à-vis an NWC will not be easy for the Government 
such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs （MOFA）. MOFA, which bears 
responsibility for Japanese diplomacy, has various sections related to 
the NWC, including not only a department in charge of disarmament 
but also bureaus in charge of the security policies and so on. It 
is between these organizations that policy decisions are made 
consequent to adjustments being made to approvals and matters 
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related to the affairs under their jurisdiction. For this reason, I would 
like to draw your attention, for example, to Japan’s addresses and 
voting attitudes at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 
which are consequent to comprehensive adjustments made in light 
of requests from security-related bureaus to position even the NWC 
within nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation systems based on 
the NPT so as to secure extended deterrence.
　In addition, in the past few years, a National Security Secretariat 
has also been set up within the Cabinet Secretariat to coordinate 
Japan’s security policies. Thus, initiatives such as the NWC are 
decided through a multilayered decision-making mechanism to the 
extent that they are directly linked to national interest. Accordingly, 
at the departmental level of the MOFA that is responsible for 
diplomacy pertaining to disarmament and nonproliferation, policy 
change is bound to be fraught with difficulties without fundamental 
change in the circumstances or political initiative as I am sure, we 
can well imagine. With that in mind, I would like to see what might 
relate to the NWC negotiations from recent official questions.
　First, with regard to an NWC to ban the use of nuclear weapons, 
we have the example of a written answer to a question submitted by 
Hiroyuki Konishi, a member of the House of Councilors:
　
* Japan's basic position on nuclear disarmament is that in order 
to realize a world without nuclear weapons that is based on 
the accurate recognition of the inhumanity of nuclear weapons 
and a calm awareness of the harsh security environment, it 
is essential to take realistic and practical measures through 
cooperation between the world’s Nuclear-Weapon-States （NWS） 
and Non-nuclear-Weapon States （NNWS）.
Negotiating the Nuclear Weapons Convention: With a Mind to Its Future Conclusion 171
* Japan opposed the proposed resolution after repeated careful 
examination because of the fact that given that the nuclear and 
ballistic missile development by the DPRK （Democratic people’
s republic of Korea） constitutes a serious and imminent threat 
to Japan's security, it was not consistent with Japan’s basic 
position, as described above, and that it served to deepen 
schisms and promote antagonism between the NWS and NWS.
* As Foreign Minister Kishida responded at the Special Committee 
on the TPP （Trans-Pacific Partnership）, while bearing in mind 
the need to firmly argue our position from the standpoint 
that in addition to the commencement of negotiations, as the 
only country to have been suffered from the wartime use of 
atomic bombs, it is also essential for Japan to participate in 
the negotiations working for cooperation between the NWS 
and NNWS. In any case, we wish to consider this further on 
the basis of future discussions on the details regarding how the 
negotiations will take place. 
　In addition, some lawmakers asked for detailed answers regarding 
the resolution on “the advancement of multilateral nuclear 
disarmament negotiations.” Leaving out portions overlapping with 
the above, the following example is a written answer given in 
response to questions by Mizuho Fukushima, a member of the House 
of Councilors:
　
* The resolution in question concerns the decision to enter into 
negotiations on the so-called Nuclear Weapons Convention in 
2017 and completely differs from the resolution mentioned 
previously, which aimed at the legal prohibition of nuclear 
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weapons in a general form.
* As to whether to participate in the negotiations in question, 
as stated by Foreign Minister Kishida at the press briefing 
in question, for which the transcript is publicly available on 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, “our future activities, 
including participation as well as non-participation, will be 
decided on the basis of future discussions on the details 
about how the negotiations will take place. In addition, while 
such consideration will take place at the level of the entire 
government while also looking carefully at trends among 
middle-powers countries such as Australia and Germany with 
whom we have been collaborating thus far, for myself [as 
minister], at this stage I believe that I would like to participate 
actively in the negotiations, to firmly argue our position as the 
only country which suffered from the use of atomic bombs 
from the standpoint of emphasizing cooperation between the 
NWS  and NNWS.”
* As this government has made clear since long, we believe that 
the use of nuclear weapons, owing to their extraordinarily 
destructive and murderous power, is not consistent with 
the spirit of humanitarianism that serves as the ideological 
foundation of international law. We also believe that such 
nuclear weapons, which could have catastrophic consequences 
for humankind, must never be used again and that it is 
important to persevere in realistic and steady efforts at nuclear 
disarmament with the aim of realizing a safer world without 
nuclear weapons.
* The advisory opinion rendered by the International Court 
of Justice on July 8, 1996, has stated that the “threat or 
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use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the 
requirements of the international law applicable in armed 
conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law” but “that it cannot reach a 
definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of 
nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-
defense, in which its very survival would be at stake” despite 
this being generally at odds with the same principles and rules. 
As a government, we believe that we should take this opinion 
rendered by the International Court of Justice, the main judicial 
body of the United Nations, very seriously.
* The phrase in question, “an extreme circumstance of self-
defense, in which its very survival would be at stake,” is one 
that must be determined according to individual and specific 
circumstances and is thus difficult to address in a categorical 
manner.
* It is our understanding that the contents of Annex 2 of the 
“Report of the Open-ended Working Group taking forward 
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations” in question 
were not necessarily discussed at the working group itself but 
represent a list of proposals by Member States of the United 
Nations, international organizations, and civil society actors 
participating in the working group. In addition, since there are 
no proposals by Japan, providing an answer is difficult given 
that the precise meanings of phrases such as “the use and 
threat of use of nuclear weapons,” “participating in nuclear war 
planning,” “participating in the targeting of nuclear weapons,” 
“permitting vessels with nuclear weapons in ports and territorial 
seas,” “permitting nuclear weapons from being transited 
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through national territory,” and “assistance, encouragement, 
and inducement” are not necessarily clear.
　Furthermore, the following is an example of a written answer 
to questions regarding a prohibition on the use of nuclear 
weapons submitted by Takako Suzuki, a member of the House of 
Representatives. 
* On the basis of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, as a 
matter of public policy, Japan adheres to the principle of not 
possessing any nuclear weapons, including even the ones 
whose possession is not constitutionally prohibited. In addition, 
the Atomic Energy Basic Act. （Act No. 186 of December 19, 
1955） stipulates that the utilization of nuclear energy will 
be limited to peaceful purposes. Furthermore, as a NNWS 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
（NPT）, Japan regards itself as being under an obligation not to 
receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over 
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not 
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices［u8］ and considers itself not to be 
allowed to possess any nuclear weapons.
* On this basis, as a purely legal issue concerning the relationship 
between nuclear weapons and Article 9 of the Constitution, 
the government has traditionally taken the following view: 
Since Japan has an inherent right to self-defense, retaining 
the necessary minimum level of self-defense capability is 
not necessarily prohibited by Article 9.2 of the Constitution. 
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Accordingly, even if this were to involve nuclear weapons, 
as long as this remained within the bounds of such a limit, 
possessing such arms would not necessarily be prohibited by 
the Constitution. Conversely, the possession of nuclear weapons 
exceeding such a limit is unacceptable under the constitution. 
The same understanding is also held to be valid for the use of 
nuclear weapons. This was also the substance of the reply by 
Director-General Yokobatake of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
to the House of Councilors Budget Committee on the 18th of 
August[Author10], 2016.
* As a purely legal issue, it is understood that Article 9 of the 
Constitution does not necessarily prohibit the possession or 
use of nuclear weapons and that it obviously does not mandate 
their possession or use. Accordingly, the policy decision 
whether to possess or use nuclear weapon is not denied by the 
Constitution. Rather, it is on the basis of such a policy decision 
that Japan firmly adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
and regards itself as being unable to possess any nuclear 
weapons under the terms of the Atomic Energy Basic Act 
and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
There is no problem of conflict to be discussed between the 
Constitution and the NPT as implied by the question.
　From the above, in addition to the oft-repeated conventional 
explanation of Japan’s stance and why it is unable to agree to the 
resolution, it is regarded as having been opposed by the emphasis of 
this resolution’s difference from previous resolutions that cite its aim 
as being the legal prohibition of nuclear weapons in a general form. 
Partly due to the inherent character of official questions and written 
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answers, which, as I mentioned earlier, are unlike oral replies in the 
Diet insofar as they allow little scope for discretion, even if treaty 
negotiations were to be launched in the future, the future position 
statements by the Japanese government in the international arena 
can only respond on the basis of the line taken in written answers to 
official questions such as these. My concern is that even if we were 
to leave the search for a way of resolving the schism between nuclear 
powers and nonnuclear states in the international arena to other 
diplomatic actors, the gulf inside Japan between the Government 
of Japan and the civil society groups strongly interested in nuclear 
disarmament will grow even wider.
　Given that the negotiation of an NWC is slated to begin whether 
Japan likes it or not, Japan should maintain a consistent foreign 
policy that is focused on disarmament and nonproliferation. 
Moreover, I think that most people understand that balancing this 
with national security considerations is bound to be difficult.
　I do not consider that we are only asserting a safe opinion because 
we oppose the treaty. Rather, when the treaty is drafted as normal, 
I believe that Japan, even while facing various legal and political 
constraints, should begin to propose specific clauses that could stay 
the course in such a way that they could be called “Japan clauses” 
for Japan’s active participation in treaty negotiations in a visible way. 
3. Procedural Issues (Decision-Making and Conditions for NGO 
Participation) 
　Now I would like to discuss a few representative points concerning 
what is required from a procedural perspective in terms of a 
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consensus method and conditions for NGO participation in the 
consideration of a treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. 
Firstly, concerning procedural issues, I would like to offer my 
understanding of what is currently assumed from the wording of 
the treaty negotiation mandate resolution. Paragraph 10 of the text 
of the resolution （L. 41） by the First Committee of the UN General 
Assembly is as follows:
10. Decides that the conference shall convene in New York under 
the rules of procedure of the General Assembly unless otherwise 
agreed by the conference, from 27 to 31 March and from 15 
June to 7 July 2017, with the participation and contribution of 
international organizations and civil society representatives. 
　Accordingly, unless decided otherwise, it is stated that the UN 
General Assembly Rules of Procedure shall apply and that proposals 
that do not fall under any of the important matters such as the 
approval of new member countries will be decided by “a majority of 
the members present and voting.” （N.B. The organizational session 
of the Conference, which was held on 16 February 2017, adopted 
its Rules of procedure.） We also see the view that it has become 
customary to practice a consensus approach with regard to nuclear 
disarmament as was insisted by Japan in the meeting of the working 
group.
　However, the rules of procedure used for the NPT conference 
also stipulate rules that allow decision-making by voting （even 
though these have not been applied so far）. As I recall, there was 
a case about ten years ago in which voting was suddenly used for 
the adoption of a Middle East resolution, which had traditionally 
178
been adopted by consensus at the International Atomic Energy 
Agency （IAEA） General Conference. Nevertheless, where normally 
permitted by the rules of procedure, the possibility of voting cannot 
be excluded. Thus, the adoption by vote of the report adopted at the 
recent meeting of the working group falls within the scope conceived 
by the UN General Assembly’s Rules of Procedure.
　Another possibility is that disagreements between the NWS and 
NNWS will become more pointed in the future. If this were to become 
the case, the pursuit of consensus under such conditions could come 
to pose a psychological barrier for negotiators attempting to achieve 
certain conclusions. Accordingly, even at Review conferences of the 
NPT, we can understand the reason for not excluding the possibility 
of a resolution ultimately becoming subject to voting as permitted by 
the rules of procedure.
　Even so, since the consensus decision making is explicitly stipulated 
in the rules of procedure for the Conference on disarmament and 
is, moreover, indirectly prescribed by reference to Article 8 of the 
Rules of Procedure for the Review Conference on the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons （CCW）, it is necessary for the 
question of whether to hold a meeting of government experts on 
lethal autonomous weapons systems （so-called LAWS） in 2017 to be 
decided by the consensus method at the meeting of the CCW Review 
Conference  held in Geneva in December 2016..
　Moreover, while conditions for the participation of NGOs are often 
a principal issue when negotiating rules of procedure, we may note 
that these are also written in a form such that their participation 
is explicitly permitted under the UN General Assembly’s Rules of 
Procedure.
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4. Assumed Basic Obligations and Demands for Incorporation in 
Municipal Law
　The treaties adopted by the UN vary widely, from voluminous 
conventions such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
（UNCLOS）, which consists of 320 articles, to concise documents 
such as the Arms Trade Treaty （ATT）, which features less than 30 
articles. Further, as I mentioned at the outset in reference to the 
definition of “treaty” in the VCLT, they can appear under various 
names and sometimes comprise multiple documents. In terms 
of the NWC, while there have been various proposals, including 
a model convention proposed by Costa Rica on the basis of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention （CWC） and a preemptive ban 
type NWC considering a treaty along the lines of prohibiting the 
use of nuclear weapons, which is advocated by the International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons （ICAN）, in view of treaty 
negotiations, it seems at the very least, necessary to conceive what 
kind of prohibition should be stipulated in the NWC about when 
or cut-off date for prohibition clause （i.e., temporal jurisdiction）, 
where or place where to be prohibited for use of nuclear weapons 
（i.e., territorial jurisdiction）, and how to prohibit the use of nuclear 
weapons and also about whom to prohibit.
　However, as in the approach shown for written answers to official 
questions, the position of not entering into discussions by virtue of 
opposing treaty negotiations from the outset may be theoretically 
possible. However, what I want to emphasize is that even though 
the U.S. opposed the NWC and did not attend the working group 
meeting, when we look at the document issued calling on NATO 
member states to oppose this resolution, we can find a prima facie 
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evidence that careful consideration was given, including with regard 
to the kind of legal measures required by municipal law in case of an 
imposed obligation to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, as well as 
the problem of their enactment. 
　In general Japan is, of course, a country that firmly incorporates 
the treaties into its municipal law for its national application at the 
time of conclusion. After negotiations of the NWC will be finished, 
then given Japan’s status as the only country to have suffered from 
atomic bombing, we should avoid the situation where Japan will 
not be able to obtain the Diet’s approval to conclude the treaty due 
to the fact that it will was not sufficiently reflected during the treaty 
negotiations,  although the treaty is expected to contribute to nuclear 
disarmament and nonproliferation .
　When an NWC will be concluded after future treaty negotiations, 
it would be thus necessary to secure the prohibition on the use of 
nuclear weapons by incorporating this within municipal legislation. 
Even if, as also described in the written answer to the official 
question that I presented earlier, “obviously ［the Constitution］ does 
not mandate their possession or use” given that the use of nuclear 
weapons is not possible on the premise of the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles, it may be that prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is 
not actually subject to penalty under current Japanese law.
　For example, to implement the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty at the municipal law level, the revised Act on the Regulation of 
Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors impose 
a penalty to secure the prohibition on nuclear explosions in Article 
76.3, which stipulates that “Individuals who conducted a nuclear 
explosion shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not 
more than seven years. （2） Attempts to carry out the crime set forth 
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in the preceding paragraph shall be punished.” In this kind of text, 
whether this is a dual-liability formula intended to punish not only 
natural persons but also juridical persons that perform the same kind 
of action and whether this includes crimes subject to extraterritorial 
criminal provisions of the criminal code from the perspective of 
how this might apply to Japanese nationals who have used nuclear 
weapons overseas are questions that require further examination.
　That said, the purpose of this law, as set out in Article 1 of the Act 
on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material 
and Reactors is as follows:
　This Act, in accordance with the spirit of the Atomic Energy 
Basic Act （Act No. 186 of 1955）, is enacted for the purpose 
of providing necessary regulations on refining activities, 
fabricating and enrichment activities, interim storage activities, 
reprocessing activities and waste disposal activities, as well as 
on the installation and operation, etc. of reactors, while taking 
into consideration the possibility of large scale natural disasters, 
terror attacks, or other criminal acts, and also for the purpose 
of providing necessary regulations on the uses of international 
controlled material to execute treaties or other international 
agreements concerning the research, development and use 
of nuclear energy, in order to ensure that the uses of nuclear 
source material, nuclear fuel material and reactors are limited 
to peaceful ones, and at the same time, to ensure public safety 
by preventing hazards due to the event that a severe accident 
at a nuclear facility causes a discharge of an abnormal level 
of radioactive materials outside the factory or place of activity 
where said nuclear facility is installed, or otherwise resulting 
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from nuclear source material, nuclear fuel material, and reactors, 
and protecting nuclear fuel material, thereby contributing to 
protecting people's lives, health, and property, preserving the 
environment, and assuring national security.
　Accordingly, where a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons is 
not consistent with the objective of peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
as set out in Article 1 of the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source 
Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, it is necessary for the 
prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons to be stipulated under 
municipal law by a separate independent piece of legislation.
　Further, with regard to the case of self-defense within the scope 
allowed by Article 9 of the Constitution, it is much more difficult  to 
understand a school of thought that considers that “since Japan has 
an inherent right to self-defense, retaining the necessary minimum 
level of self-defense capability is not necessarily prohibited by Article 
9.2 of the Constitution. Accordingly, even if this were the case of 
nuclear weapons, so long as this remained within the bounds of such 
a limit, possession of such arms would not necessarily be prohibited 
by the Constitution.”
　This is akin to the conclusion of the dispositive  E2 of the 
International Court of Justice （ICJ） advisory opinion on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in which the ICJ states 
that “it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or 
illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at 
stake.” This way, if a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons falls 
within the scope of self-defense, it could be interpreted as being not 
a legal question but merely a policy choice. Since we are all familiar 
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with the terrible consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, 
after conducting sufficient comparative balancing vis-à-vis security 
considerations, it is necessary to minimize the range of any exception 
to such prohibition as much as possible.
　Most mult i lateral  treat ies are devised to promote their 
universalization after adjustments to the interests of the countries 
concerned even though the methods by which this is accomplished 
are more often than not denigrated as “loopholes.” Nevertheless, 
to the extent that we can tolerate the range of reservations and 
exemption clause I mentioned at the beginning, it is necessary to 
create treaties in a way such that as many countries as possible can 
become party to them, ensuring the effectiveness of the prohibition 
and regulation.
　As a practical problem, it is actually difficult to secure the 
implementation of treaties concluded by Japan in areas on Japanese 
territory that are not under the jurisdiction or control of the Japanese 
government, in particular, places such as overseas diplomatic 
establishments or U.S. military bases stationed in Japan. For example, 
it is not easy to respond to violations of basic obligations occurring in 
facilities or areas belonging to U.S. forces stationed in Japan, which 
are not controlled by a country that is not even a State Signatory of 
the Anti-Personnel Land Mines Convention or the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions （CCM）. This is because, strictly speaking, non-
State party that have not expressed consent to these treaties are not 
subject to any legal obligation, and this does not therefore constitute 
a violation thereof.
　Thus, even more than the abstract conceptual level of extended 
deterrence, the extremely difficult challenges of ensuring consistency 
with the relevant provisions of the Japan―US Security Treaty and so 
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on wait at a more practical level.
　A recent disarmament treaty, the CCM, Article 21 of the CCM to 
be precise, concerns countries that are not parties to the convention 
（particularly those such as the U.S.）, works to resolve contradictions 
while encouraging participation in the form of a provision that “in 
accordance with international law, States Parties, their military 
personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and 
operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage 
in activities prohibited to a State Party.” Of course, as to the extent 
to which exceptions are permitted by such an exemption provision, 
there might be  the views that this may create loopholes, in other 
words, this is difficult to accept.
5. In Conclusion
　In order to develop the discussion of the NWC found in Naze kaku 
wa nakunaranai no ka II ［Why We Can't Eliminate Nuclear Weapons 2］
（Hōritsu bunkasha, 2016）, I have written that we need to clarify the 
legal interests that would be protected by a legal prohibition on the 
use of nuclear weapons. This is because, keeping in mind not only 
treaty negotiations but also the future conclusion of such a treaty by 
Japan, it will be necessary to secure such a treaty with legal penalties 
for it national implementation. Moreover, on the basis of the legal 
doctrine of nulla poena sine lege （"no penalty without a law"）, it is also 
incumbent on us to clarify the definition and definite semantic scope, 
as well as the necessity, of what constitutes a “prohibition on the use 
of nuclear weapons.”
　Regarding these protected legal interests, a precedent studies has 
attempted to present four forms of protected legal interest on the 
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basis of the concept of interest （infringement/compromise） in the 
terms, for example, of protective legitimacy and criminal law theory.
　That is, as specific examples, it cites （1） that which constitutes the 
core of personality and protects the core essentials of life and body, 
（2） that which a person finds desirable even if this is also a personal 
interest, （3） interests （e.g., property rights） and things constituted as 
societal or public matters （e.g., environmental protection） that are 
only protected by law insofar as they belong to individuals, and （4） 
national protected interests. 
　Even though this is no more than a theory in the field other than 
criminal law in general as it relates to the negotiation of the NWC, 
it is also suggestive with reference to discussions of any prohibition 
on the use of nuclear weapons. We cannot simply begin and end by 
regarding a prohibition on their use as the natural consequence of 
the inherent inhumanity of nuclear weapons. Rather, I believe that 
we need to ensure a secure theoretical grounding that also includes 
such legal aspects.
　I am afraid that I have set out the foregoing discussion rather 
roughly; however, the points to be discussed in the treaty negotiations 
are the issues of definition, basic obligations, relationships with 
other international conventions including the UN Charter, national 
implementation, decision-making bodies such as the Conference of 
the States Parties, a dispute resolution clause, and final provisions 
such as the requirement for entry into force, and it will be necessary 
to first consider how typical provisions should be provided for in 
such a treaty.
　Furthermore, if Japan wishes to serve in an intermediary role, it 
will be necessary to steer the discussion after looking carefully at the 
respective trends of each country. In future, after examining such 
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details, since it is fine for Japan to contribute only in areas where its 
strengths lie and in ways that will not damage its national interests, its 
contribution may be expected in the form of the proposal of concrete 
wording for working documents.
　In addition, the NWC is a treaty concept that concerns the entire 
field of international security, including disarmament. Therefore the 
Government of Japan as a whole should seek what is called for is a 
truly “realistic and practical” response. Since international law （the 
Law of Nations） is what basically regulates relationships between 
states, we need to ensure that the country, i.e., the government―
does its best. However, in part because the resolution mandating 
treaty negotiation is premised on participation and contributions 
from international organizations and civil society, I believe that it is 
incumbent on university officials like us to participate, in a good way, 
by helping to produce knowledge while maintaining an appropriate 
wariness of, and distance from, the government as members of civil 
society. Thank you very much for your attention. 
*This translated version was revised on June 1, 2017.
